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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “the Act”) recognizes the right of employees to 
engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. By “encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining,” the Act attempts to mitigate and eliminate labor-related 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce. Although union membership has declined dramatically since 
the 1950s, congressional interest in the NLRA remains significant. In the 112th Congress, over 30 bills 
have been introduced to amend the NLRA. Some of these bills address the timing of union representation 
elections, while others are concerned with varying aspects of the NLRA, such as the activities of the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which implements and administers the Act. 
Since the NLRA’s enactment in 1935, the NLRB and the courts have considered a variety of issues arising 
under the Act. This report reviews selected decisions of the NLRB and the courts on three of them. 
Determining when an employee may be deemed a supervisor for purposes of coverage under the Act is 
important because the right to engage in collective bargaining is extended only to employees under the 
NLRA. Employees who are properly classified as supervisors are not afforded collective bargaining rights. 
Both employers and unions are prohibited from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed to them under the Act. In general, to determine whether an unfair labor practice has 
been committed by either an employer or union, a reviewing court asks whether the misconduct 
“reasonably tends” to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the NLRA. Courts 
have emphasized that the actual effect of the misconduct is immaterial. 
Finally, pre-election communication with employees may influence the outcome of a representation 
election. While the NLRA does prohibit an employer from interfering with an employee’s collective 
bargaining rights, decisions discussed in this report indicate that an employer does not violate the Act in 
all cases when it denies a union access to its property. 
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Summary 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “the Act”) recognizes the right of employees to 
engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. By “encouraging 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining,” the Act attempts to mitigate and eliminate 
labor-related obstructions to the free flow of commerce. Although union membership has 
declined dramatically since the 1950s, congressional interest in the NLRA remains significant. In 
the 112th Congress, over 30 bills have been introduced to amend the NLRA. Some of these bills 
address the timing of union representation elections, while others are concerned with varying 
aspects of the NLRA, such as the activities of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
which implements and administers the Act. 
Since the NLRA’s enactment in 1935, the NLRB and the courts have considered a variety of 
issues arising under the Act. This report reviews selected decisions of the NLRB and the courts 
on three of them. Determining when an employee may be deemed a supervisor for purposes of 
coverage under the Act is important because the right to engage in collective bargaining is 
extended only to employees under the NLRA. Employees who are properly classified as 
supervisors are not afforded collective bargaining rights. 
Both employers and unions are prohibited from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed to them under the Act. In general, to determine whether an unfair labor 
practice has been committed by either an employer or union, a reviewing court asks whether the 
misconduct “reasonably tends” to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights 
under the NLRA. Courts have emphasized that the actual effect of the misconduct is immaterial. 
Finally, pre-election communication with employees may influence the outcome of a 
representation election. While the NLRA does prohibit an employer from interfering with an 
employee’s collective bargaining rights, decisions discussed in this report indicate that an 
employer does not violate the Act in all cases when it denies a union access to its property. 
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he National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “the Act”) recognizes the right of employees to 
engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. By 
“encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining,” the Act attempts to 
mitigate and eliminate labor-related obstructions to the free flow of commerce.1 Although union 
membership has declined dramatically since the 1950s, congressional interest in the NLRA 
remains significant.2 In the 112th Congress, over 30 bills have been introduced to amend the 
NLRA. Some of these bills address the timing of union representation elections, while others are 
concerned with varying aspects of the NLRA, such as the activities of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), which implements and administers the Act. 
Since the NLRA’s enactment in 1935, the NLRB and the courts have considered a variety of 
issues arising under the Act. This report reviews selected decisions of the NLRB and the courts 
that involve topics that continue to be relevant for employers and unions during the collective 
bargaining process. 
Coverage Under the NLRA 
The right to engage in collective bargaining under the NLRA does not apply to all individuals 
employed by an employer.3 Rather, the right extends only to “employees.” Section 2(3) of the 
NLRA states that an employee “shall include any employee ... but shall not include any individual 
... employed as a supervisor.”4 An employee’s job title does not determine whether an individual 
is a supervisor for purposes of the NLRA. Instead, the term “supervisor” is defined by the Act to 
include any individual with the authority to perform any one of 12 specified functions, if the 
exercise of such authority requires the use of independent judgment and is not merely routine or 
clerical. 
Section 2(11) of the NLRA states: 
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, 
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline 
other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to 
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is 
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.5 
Because the 12 functions and the term “independent judgment” are not further defined, the NLRB 
and U.S. Supreme Court have sought to provide meaning to this language. 
In NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., the Court considered whether certain nurses 
should be classified as supervisors for purposes of the NLRA when their judgment was informed 
                                                 
1 See 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
2 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union Members – 2011 (Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (identifying the union membership rate for private sector workers in 
2011 as 11.8 percent). See also Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership Rate Fell Again in 2011, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 
2012, at B3 (“In the 1950s, more than 35 percent of private sector workers were in unions.”). 
3 For additional information on coverage under the National Labor Relations Act, see CRS Report RL34350, The 
Definition of “Supervisor” Under the National Labor Relations Act, by Gerald Mayer and Jon O. Shimabukuro. 
4 29 U.S.C. §152(3). 
5 29 U.S.C. §152(11). 
T 
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by professional or technical training or experience.6 Kentucky River Community Care, the 
operator of a care facility for individuals with mental retardation and illness, sought to exclude six 
registered nurses (RNs) from a bargaining unit on the grounds that they were supervisors. The 
NLRB concluded that the nurses were not supervisors because they failed to exercise sufficient 
independent judgment. According to the NLRB, the nurses used “ordinary professional or 
technical judgment” in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with 
employer-specified standards.7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
NLRB’s position, and the Court ultimately affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 
The Kentucky River Court understood section 2(11) of the NLRA to set forth a three-part test for 
determining supervisory status. Employees will be considered supervisors if (1) they hold the 
authority to engage in any one of the twelve supervisory functions identified in section 2(11) of 
the NLRA; (2) their exercise of authority is not of a “merely routine or clerical nature, but 
requires the use of independent judgment,” and (3) their authority is held in the interest of the 
employer.8 At issue in Kentucky River, was the second part of the test. Although the Court 
recognized the NLRB’s discretion to clarify the meaning of the term “independent judgment,” it 
maintained that it was inappropriate for the NLRB to characterize judgment that reflects 
“ordinary professional or technical judgment” as failing to be independent judgment. 
The Court believed that the NLRB’s reference to “ordinary or technical judgment” established a 
“startling categorical exclusion” that was not suggested by the NLRA’s statutory text.9 The Court 
observed: 
What supervisory judgment worth exercising, one must wonder, does not rest on 
‘professional or technical skill or experience?’ If the Board applied this aspect of its test to 
every exercise of a supervisory function, it would virtually eliminate ‘supervisors’ from the 
Act.10 
In addition, the Court indicated that it was unaware of any NLRB decision that concluded that a 
supervisor’s judgment ceased to be independent judgment because it depended on the 
supervisor’s professional or technical training or experience.11 The Court maintained that when an 
employee exercises one of the functions identified in section 2(11) with judgment that possesses a 
sufficient degree of independence, the NLRB “invariably finds supervisory status.”12 
Four justices dissented from the majority’s position on independent judgment.13 The dissent 
maintained that the NLRB’s interpretation of independent judgment was fully rational and 
consistent with the NLRA. The dissent noted: “The term ‘independent judgment’ is indisputably 
                                                 
6 532 U.S. 706 (2001). 
7 Id. at 713. 
8 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)). 
9 Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. at 714. 
10 Id. at 715. 
11 Id. at 716. 
12 Id. 
13 Justice Stevens filed an opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, that dissented from the majority 
opinion on the question of independent judgment. However, Justice Stevens’ opinion concurred with the majority 
opinion on the question of which party bears the burden of proving or disproving an employee’s supervisory status in 
an unfair labor practice proceeding. 
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ambiguous, and it is settled law that the NLRB’s interpretation of ambiguous language in the 
[NLRA] is entitled to deference.14 
In 2006, the NLRB revisited the issue of supervisory status in Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.15 
Oakwood Healthcare employed approximately 181 RNs in 10 patient care units at an acute care 
hospital. Many of these nurses served as charge nurses who were responsible for overseeing their 
patient care units and assigning other RNs, technicians, and medical personnel on their shifts. 
Some of the RNs worked permanently as charge nurses, while others rotated into the charge nurse 
position. Oakwood Healthcare sought to exclude both the permanent and the rotating charge 
nurses from a proposed bargaining unit on the grounds that they were supervisors within the 
meaning of section 2(11). Oakwood Healthcare maintained that the charge nurses were 
supervisors because they “used independent judgment in assigning and responsibly directing 
employees.”16 
The NLRB viewed Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. as an opportunity to define the terms “assign,” 
“responsibly to direct,” and “independent judgment” as they are used in section 2(11) of the 
NLRA.17 With each term, the NLRB considered the language used by Congress, as well as the 
NLRA’s legislative history, applicable policy considerations, and Supreme Court precedent.18 The 
NLRB concluded that the term “assign” should be construed to refer to the act of designating an 
employee to a place (such as a location or department), appointing an employee to a time, or 
giving significant overall duties or tasks to an employee.19 The NLRB noted that in the health 
care setting, the term “encompasses the charge nurses’ responsibility to assign nurses and aides to 
particular patients.”20 The term would not apply, however, to an individual who simply chooses 
the order in which an employee will perform discrete tasks within an assignment. 
Citing the legislative history of section 2(11), the NLRB interpreted the term “responsibly to 
direct” to apply to individuals who not only oversee the work being performed, but are held 
responsible if the work is done poorly or not at all. The NLRB observed: 
[F]or direction to be ‘responsible,’ the person directing and performing the oversight of the 
employee must be accountable for the performance of the task by the other, such that some 
adverse consequence may befall the one providing the oversight if the tasks performed by the 
employee are not performed properly. This interpretation of ‘responsibly to direct’ is 
consistent with post-Kentucky River Board decisions that considered an accountability 
element for ‘responsibly to direct.’21 
According to the NLRB, to establish accountability for purposes of responsible direction, it must 
be shown that the employer delegated to the putative supervisor the authority to direct the work 
                                                 
14 Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. at 725-26. 
15 348 NLRB 686 (2006). 
16 Id. at 687. 
17 Id. at 688 (“Thus, exercising our discretion to interpret ambiguous language in the Act, and consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s instructions in Kentucky River, we herein adopt definitions for the terms ‘assign,’ ‘responsibly to 
direct,’ and ‘independent judgment’ as those terms are used in Section 2(11) of the Act.”). 
18 See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 688-89. 
19 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 689. 
20 Id. 
21 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 691-92. 
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and the authority to take corrective action.22 The possibility of adverse consequences for the 
putative supervisor must also be established. 
With regard to the term “independent judgment,” the NLRB maintained that at a minimum an 
individual must act or effectively recommend action that is “free of the control of others and form 
an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data.”23 The NLRB further elaborated that 
a judgment is not independent if it is dictated or controlled by detailed instructions in company 
policies, the verbal instructions of a higher authority, or the provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement.24 The NLRB sought to interpret the term “independent judgment” in light of the 
phrase “not of a merely routine or clerical nature,” which appears before “independent judgment” 
in section 2(11). The NLRB stated: 
If there is only one obvious and self-evident choice ... or if the assignment is made solely on 
the basis of equalizing workloads, then the assignment is routine or clerical in nature and 
does not implicate independent judgment, even if it is made free of the control of others and 
involves forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data.25 
Applying the new definitions for the terms “assign,” “responsibly to direct,” and “independent 
judgment,” the NLRB concluded that 12 permanent charge nurses assigned to five of the 10 
patient care units were supervisors for purposes of the NLRA. The NLRB declined to find that 
any of the charge nurses responsibly directed other employees. The NLRB noted that the charge 
nurses were not subject to discipline or lower evaluations if employees who were subject to the 
nurses failed to adequately performed their tasks. However, in five of the 10 patient care units, the 
NLRB found that the charge nurses did assign employees within the meaning of the NLRA. 
These nurses assigned employees to patients and assigned overall tasks to the employees. The 
charge nurses in the five units were unlike emergency room charge nurses who simply placed 
staff in geographic areas within the emergency room. 
The NLRB determined that the 12 charge nurses exercised independent judgment in accordance 
with section 2(11). The charge nurses made assignments in light of the skill sets of employees and 
the nursing time patients would require on a given shift. The NLRB noted that the “process of 
equalizing work loads at the hospital involves independent judgment.”26 While Oakwood 
Healthcare maintained a written policy for assigning nursing personnel to deliver care to patients, 
the NLRB observed that charge nurses were given considerable latitude in making decisions on 
how to assign nursing personnel. Ultimately, the NLRB concluded that when a charge nurse 
makes an assignment based on the skill, experience, and temperament of nursing personnel and 
the patients, that nurse has “exercised the requisite discretion to make the assignment a 
supervisory function ‘requir[ing] the use of independent judgment.’”27 
                                                 
22 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 692. 
23 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 693. 
24 Id. The NLRB did indicate that the mere existence of company policies would not eliminate independent judgment 
from decision-making if the policies allow for discretionary choices. 
25 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 693. 
26 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 697. 
27 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 NLRB at 698. 
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Unfair Labor Practices and Interference With 
Collective Bargaining 
In addition to recognizing the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining, the NLRA 
prohibits certain misconduct by both employers and unions that interferes with that right. Section 
8(a)(1) of the Act states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.”28 Similarly, 
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor 
organization or its agents to “restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7 ...”29 
Although the NLRB has suggested in the past that Congress did not intend for section 8(b)(1)(A) 
to be given the broad application sometimes accorded to section 8(a)(1), section 8(b)(1)(A) 
appears to be viewed generally as a counterpart to section 8(a)(1).30 Indeed, in Capital Service, 
Inc. v. NLRB, a 1953 case involving a union boycott of goods manufactured by employees who 
resisted unionization, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that it was 
“inconceivable” that the NLRA “intended the identical words ‘restrain or coerce’ of 8(a)(1) and 
8(b)(1) to have a different meaning when applied to a labor organization from that when applied 
to an employer.”31 
To determine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed under either subsection, a 
reviewing court asks the same question: whether the misconduct “reasonably tends” to restrain or 
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the NLRA.32 Courts have emphasized that 
the actual effect of the misconduct is immaterial. In Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-
CIO v. NLRB, a 1964 case involving picketing and the right of employees to refrain from union 
activities, the Third Circuit maintained: “That no one was in fact coerced or intimidated is of no 
relevance. The test of coercion and intimidation is not whether the misconduct proves 
effective.”33 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits not only the use or threatened use of violence against an 
employee for exercising his rights under section 7 of the Act, but also verbal threats to adversely 
                                                 
28 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, recognizes the right of employees to engage in 
collective bargaining. 
29 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). 
30 See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 90 (John E. Higgins et al. eds., 2006). 
31 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). 
32 Compare Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Medical Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1472 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The test for 
violations of section 8(a)(1) is not whether an attempt at coercion has succeeded or failed, but ‘whether the employer 
engaged in conduct which reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the free exercise of their 
section 7 rights.’”), and Local 542, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 852-53 (3rd 
Cir. 1964) (“The Union urges in support of its argument that the episodes ‘had no effect upon the operation of the 
employer’s business, and they coerced or intimidated no one.’ ... The test is whether the misconduct is such that, under 
the circumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected 
under the Act.”). 
33 Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 328 F.2d at 852. 
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affect an employee’s employment status or working conditions.34 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 
Inc., the Supreme Court explained: 
[A]n employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about 
unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the 
communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’ He may 
even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his 
company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of 
objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences 
beyond his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant 
in case of unionization.35 
Whether an employer’s communication to its employees constitutes an unlawful threat for 
purposes of section 8(a)(1) is generally fact-specific and requires consideration of the totality of 
the circumstances. The Gissel Court noted that any assessment of the precise scope of employer 
expression “must be made in the context of its labor relations setting” and must take into account 
the economic dependence of the employees on their employers.36 
An employer’s interrogation of its employees as to union sympathy and affiliation may also 
violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act because such an interrogation has a “natural tendency to instill 
in the minds of employees fear of discrimination on the basis of the information the employer has 
obtained.”37 In Blue Flash Express, Inc., the NLRB indicated that it would consider five factors 
when determining whether an interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the 
exercise of rights guaranteed by the NLRA: the timing of the interrogation; the place of the 
interrogation; the information sought during the interrogation; the identity of the interrogator; and 
the employer’s conceded preference with respect to the subject of the interrogation.38 Using these 
factors, the Board found a violation of section 8(a)(1) when an employer interrogated an 
employee after a performance review, despite resistance by the employee.39 The Board also found 
a violation when an interrogation was conducted by a high-level supervisor, without a legitimate 
purpose, and without any assurances against reprisals.40 
The use or threatened use of violence by a union or one of its agents is similarly considered an 
unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.41 Other acts by unions have been 
found to violate section 8(b)(1)(A), including encouraging employees to quit their jobs because 
they were not members of the union, and threatening discharge for failure to sign union 
authorization cards. 
                                                 
34 See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 185-86 (discussing section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and employer violence). See 
also Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 946, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing various acts of 
misconduct that violate section 8(a)(1), including threatening to close a facility if employees select a union as their 
collective bargaining representative, and threatening to discharge employees for engaging in union activities). 
35 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). 
36 Id. at 617. 
37 NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., Inc., 205 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1953). 
38 109 NLRB 591 (1954). 
39 See Litton Systems, 300 NLRB 324 (1990). 
40 See North Hills Office Services, Inc., 344 NLRB 1083 (2005). 
41 See Teamsters Local 115 (Kurz-Hastings, Inc.), 344 NLRB 644 (2005). See also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 
274-76 (discussing section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA and employer violence). 
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In Local Union No. 697 (UE & C Catalytic, Inc.), the NLRB found a violation of section 
8(b)(1)(A) when a local union engaged in a pattern of misconduct to get members of other unions 
employed at an Amoco refinery, identified as “travelers,” to abandon their jobs because they were 
not members of the local union and because a large number of local members were out of work.42 
The pattern of misconduct included repeated requests and suggestions that the travelers quit their 
jobs and volunteer for layoffs. The local also devised a credentialing system just for the travelers 
and refused to renew some of the credentials. The NLRB concluded that the local’s efforts were 
coercive and meant to intimidate the travelers into leaving the refinery: “It wanted the travelers to 
leave the Amoco jobsite because they were not members of [the local] and because members 
were out of work.”43 
The NLRB has indicated that section 8(b)(1)(A) “broadly interdicts any union conduct 
threatening job security of employees because of the employees’ refusal or failure to abide by 
union membership conditions.”44 By telling employees that they must sign a union authorization 
card or be subject to termination, a union makes “an implied threat of reprisal calculated to 
interfere with the employees’ statutory right to refrain from any and all union activities.”45 
Unions have been found to violate section 8(b)(1)(A) by engaging in other misconduct, including 
attempting to cause an employer to discharge employees because they opposed the union 
leadership, refusing to refer dissident union members for jobs, and threatening employees with 
the loss of employment if they contested a union election.46 
Pre-Election Communication with Employees 
While section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA does prohibit an employer from interfering with the right of 
employees to engage in collective bargaining, the NLRB has long maintained that an employer 
may make antiunion, but noncoercive, speeches to their employees on company time and on 
company property without allowing a union an equal opportunity to reply. In Livingston Shirt 
Corp., the NLRB noted: 
[W]e find nothing in the statute which even hints at any congressional intent to restrict an 
employer in the use of his own premises for the purpose of airing his views. On the contrary, 
an employer’s premises are the natural forum for him just as the union hall is the inviolable 
forum for the union to assemble and address employees. We do not believe that unions will 
be unduly hindered in their right to carry on organizational activities by our refusal to open 
up to them the employer’s premises for group meetings, particularly since this is an area 
from which they have traditionally been excluded, and there remains open to them all the 
customary means for communicating with employees.47 
                                                 
42 318 NLRB 443 (1995). 
43 Id. at 446. 
44 United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 232 NLRB 326, 329 (1977). 
45 Id. See also Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, 331 NLRB 1407 (2000) (affirming Administrative Law 
Judge’s finding that a union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by telling employees who were reclassified into positions that 
fell within an existing bargaining unit that they would be discharged if they failed to sign authorization cards). 
46 See 1-5 Nat’l Lab. Rel. Act: Law & Prac. (MB) § 5.11. 
47 107 NLRB 400, 406 (1953). 
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Last-minute speeches made by employers, however, have been distinguished from other pre-
election speeches. In Peerless Plywood Co., decided the same day as Livingston Shirt, the NLRB 
declared that employers and unions are prohibited from making election speeches on company 
time to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before an election.48 The NLRB 
maintained that such speeches interfere with a free election by creating a “mass psychology 
which overrides arguments made through other campaign media and giv[ing] an unfair advantage 
to the party, whether employer or union, who in this manner obtains the last most telling word.”49 
In 1956, the Court considered whether an employer could prohibit the distribution of union 
literature on its company-owned parking lots by nonemployee union organizers. In NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilson Co., the employer contended that it had a consistent policy against all 
pamphleteering and that it was not attempting to impede its employees’ collective bargaining 
rights when it restricted the distribution of union literature on company property. 50 The Court 
maintained an employer cannot be compelled to allow the distribution of union literature on its 
premises if a union can reach employees through other channels of communication. If, however, 
the employer’s location and the employees’ residences place the employees beyond the reach of 
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, the employer must allow the union to 
approach its employees on its property. In Babcock, the Court ultimately found that the 
employer’s restrictions were permissible because its plants were close to the communities where 
a large percentage of employees lived, and various methods of communication were available to 
the union. 
In Lechmere v. NLRB, a 1992 case involving the efforts of the United Food and Commercial 
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, to organize employees at a retail store, the Court reaffirmed its 
holding in Babcock.51 Rejecting the NLRB’s conclusion that there were no reasonable, alternative 
means for the union to communicate with Lechmere’s employees, the Court emphasized that 
Babcock requires access to an employer’s property only when the employer’s location and the 
employees’ residences place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to 
communicate with them. The Court identified logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort 
hotels as “classic examples” where union access would be permitted.52 The Court further noted 
that the union has the heavy burden of establishing employee isolation and showing that no other 
reasonable means of communicating with employees exists.53 As in Babcock, the Court in 
Lechmere found that the union did have reasonable access to the retail employees and that this 
accessibility was suggested by the union’s success in contacting a substantial percentage of them 
directly via mailings, phone calls, and home visits.54 
 
                                                 
48 107 NLRB 427 (1953). 
49 Id. at 429. 
50 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
51 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
52 Id. at 539-40. 
53 Id. at 540. 
54 Id. 
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